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vs.
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11827
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11902

RONALD J. HATHAWAY,
Appellant,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
CONROlLTDATED BY ORDER OF COURT

,

Relief Sought: Reinstatement of "\Vrit of Habeas Corpus
a.nd/or setting aside defa ult judgment and permitting
appellant to try case on merits.

LELAND K. WIMMER
MARK S. MINER

rt•llt D

600 Utah Saving & Trust Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Atto'F11s
GEORGE, SEARLE
2805 South State Street
JAN191970
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In the Supreme Court of the Stale of Utah
IN THE MATTER OF THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR RONNIE LYNN HATHAWAY, a minor,
and LINDA LUCILLE HATHAWAY,
Respondent
vs.

Case No.
11827

Case No.

RONALD J. HATHAWAY,

11902

Appellant,
APPELLANT'S BRIEF
CONSOLIDATED BY ORDER OF COURT

rn:LIEF 80UGH1'

rrhat the Writ of Habeas Corpus be reinstated and
Appellant be granted custody of the child; or,
That the Default Judgment be set aside and the
Appellant be given a trial on merits.
STATEI\fENT OFFACTS
Appellant, Ronald J. Hathaway and R.espondent,
Linda Lucille Hathaway, were married on the 19th day
of August, 1961, and as issue of that marriage, Ronnie
Lynn Hathaway "Tas born on September 6, 1964. (TR-1)
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The Respondent on June 6, 1968, filed an action in
the District Court of Salt Lake County for a
against the Appellant, asking for the custody of the
minor child, who was then three years old, and alleging
in her Complaint that the minor child wBs in the outof-state custody of the Appellant. (TR-1) No summons
was served at this time. On January 8, 1969, Appellant
filed an action for divorce against Respondent in California asking for the custody of the said minor child,
and allPging that the: el1ild was then in his custody. 011
January 13, 1969, Respondent amended her Complaint
in her Utah
Appellant ·was personally served
in that action in California on .January 27, 19G9. (TR-1)
On ,J anuai'y 20, 19G9, Respondent was personally served
with sumrn011s in tlrn Califoni ia action and subsequently
made her a]Jp('arance therein. On
4, 1969, Respondent appeared personally and entered hy and through
h<>r counsel, her appearance in the California. action and,
in open Court, stipulated that the custody of the minor
child remain with the Appellant, and that she would not
remove the child from the State of California without
the consent of the Court. Notwithstanding the stipulation of Respondent and of counsel and the Order of the
California Court, the Respondent a, in June, 1969,
under the guise of getting the child some clothes, spiritc(l
the child away from the sister of the Appellant; she did
take the child back to Utah, and started to live under
an assumed name, to-wit: Mrs. Noah CasP. (P1r--1:7) On
l\l ay 13, 1969, Carl N emelka with drew as respondent's
counsel. No Utah Counsel appeared of record. On June

3
20, 1960,
to regain
On June
ceedings

the appellant filed a Writ of Habeas Corpus
the custody and possession of the minor child.
20, 1969, Appellant filed a notice of the proin the California action in the Utah action.
(TR-10) Respondent could not be found to be served
on the first writ which was to be heard on June 23, 1969
(
so another writ was issued on July 2,
Hl69, to be heard on July 7th at 2 p.m. ( (HC)-TR-4)
Respondent was served with a copy of the writ on July
3, 1969. ( (HC)-TR-5) Nothwithstanding that no default
diYorces were to be heard that on the morning of Monday,
Jnly 7, 1969. Respondent n1Shed to court and, without any notice to appellant's counsel, had the Honorable
Joseph G. Jeppson, the trial court judge who was to hear
the writ at 2 p.m. that same afternoon, enter the default
of Appellant, and grant a divorce to respondent and
reserve the i:;sue of custody until the hearing on the
writ that afternoon. The default divorce action was
concealed from appellant until after Habeas Corpus
hearings 1rns completed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN DISCHARGING THE WRIT
OF HABEAS CORPUS.

rrhe trial court ignored the Order of the California
court rPstraining the Respondent from taking the minor

4
child out of the State of California and made findings
that the California court was without jurisdiction because the appellant was not a resident of the state of
California when he commenced the California action.
(R-14, 15) \Ve submit that this was an erroneous finding of fact. A fair survey of the record indicates that
he was physically present in California for the year preceding the filing of the action except for a temporary
absence of eight weeks. (TR-35) A large portion of
whirh he s1wnt deer hnnting. (TR-2G)
He was employed only in California a.nd paid his
California income tax for tlw year, 19118, which preceded the filing of the a di on. (R-25, 33) The California
Court found him to he a resident anfl respondent so
admitted when sh<-' appeared in op('n Court and askeu
for affirmative rPlief, to-\vit: eustody of the child. (R-38)
lifarrh 17, 19G9.
In any event, Respondent's case in this attack on
tlrn ju!'isdiction of the California Court was defective
in that she did not plead and prove the California Statutory Law in this respect to prove the length of time of
the California residence requirement. Utah will not take
judicial notice of the statutes of another state. Shurtliff
u. Oregon Short Line R. Co., G6 U. Hll, 241 P. 1058:
Dichson v. 11hrllings, G6 U. 282, 241 P. 840, 43 A.L.R. 13G.

Nor will the rule that in the absenre of proof of foreign
statutory law, it is presumed that the law of the foreign
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jurisdiction is the same as the law of the forum since
the residency period in Utah is only three months.
Although a litigant cannot confer jurisdiction upon
a Court by consent, it is well settled that a parent can
waive it's right to custody.
State of Montana el rel. Sherman Ernest Lessley
Relator Y. District Court Gallatin County, et al.,
R0spondents :ns P.2d 571 (Montana, 1957).
Not only did tlw Respondent spirit the minor child away
in violation of the California Order, it was also in violation of an Order which slw, hersPlf had stipulated to
in open ('OUrt. (TR Exhihit 1)
Appellant signed a Verified Complaint in California
alleging his residence. This was subsequently proved to
the California Court's satisfaction. Respondent herself
asked the California Court for affirmative relief in that
she made a motion for the temporary custody of the
minor child. (R-26)
In any event the lower court was leaning on a slendl'r reed to upset the jurisdiction of the California court
on tlw basis of appellant's obtaining a Utah resident
hunting license in the fall of 1968. The record shows
he was working in California and was living there and
pai(l his :;;tate income tax there. The lower court resolved
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for transitory evidence of mental intentions to abregate
California residency in order to obviate the effect of
the California order and to avoid the issue of Respondent's blatent "seize and run" conduct in respect to the
custody of the minor child.
POINT II.
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SETTING THE DEFAULT
ASIDE.

The lower court did not have jurisdiction to enter
the default against the appellant in Civil Case 180008.
The summons which was served upon appellant was defectiYe and Yoid under Rule no's 4 and 5, U.R.C.P. The
sheriff did not endorse the date, place of service, time,
and his official titl0 thereto on appellant's copy.
Failure to do so deprives the court of jurisdiction and
is fatal. Thomas v. District Court of Third Judicial District in and for Salt Lake Coimty at, 110 Utah 245, 171 P.
2nd 667; Tolbert v. Utah Sand and Gravel ProdHcts Cor-

poration, 402 Pac. 703, 16 Ut. 2nd 407. The senice of
process must comply -..vith the rules of the law of the
forum. In California the clerk of thti court issues the
summons. (R-31) Because of our practice, endorsement
hy the process servf'r is indispensahle in order to give
som8 0vidence of the official characfrr of tlif'
appearing on its facP other than the signature of an
agent (attorney) for the approying litigant.
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At any rate in the Thomas case, it was held that
such service without endorsing on the Summons where
it was served, upon whom it was served, the date of
service, and the server's official title is fatal and there
is no reason for a different rule for service outside the
State where personal service is a substitute for publication.
RegardlE'ss of the validity of the entry of the default judgment, as a matter of equity, the lower Court
should have granted Appellant's timely Motion to Set
the Default Aside. Irrespective of the technical rules
of Court in custody cases, the welfare of the children
haw always been of paramount concern and appellant
should
ht>en hPard in this regard. The Affidavit
and proposed answPr of the appellant in support of his
motion to set aside the default raised grave issues as
to the Respondent's fitness with regard to the custody
of the minor child. (R-40) It is alleged that the Respondent is a heavy user of alcoholic beverages and a
user of dangerous drugs and she has attempted suicide
on several occasions and has made threatening statements pertaining to herself and the minor child. She
was living under the name of l\frs. Noah Case in circumstances ·which warrantPd a review.
Although the Trial Court, in the morning reserved
a ruling on the issue of custody until the hearing of the
\Vrit that afternoon as to the Respondent's fitness for
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custody. The fitness of the respondent was never tried
at either proceeding which entirely ignored the ·welfare
of the minor child. (R-50, 51) The lower Court's remarks in connecting with the appellant's taking the child
from the State ·were not justified by any of the testimony at no time was the appellant under any Utah
Court order not to remove the child from the State.
In fact, in both Respondent's Complaint and in her
Amended Complaint, she alleged that the Appellant had
the custody of the minor child and was out of state.
(R-1, 4) The law is well settled that upon a timely
Motion and for good cause shown, a D0fault .Judgment
·will he set mri<l.0.
See l\faylww vs. Gilsonite Company, 14 U.2d 52, 37()
Pn<:>. 5:11.
rrhe granting of the Default Judgment at 10 A.M.
knowing all parties would appear at 2 p.m. and the
advising the Appellant after the second hearing that a
Default Judgment had been taken at 10 A.M. that morning certainly was arbitrary. Then, refusing to set same
aside on immediate :Moton was an abuse of discretion.
CONCLURTON

To recapitulate, the facts of the instant case show
that the respondent, in defiance of a California Court
Order to which she herself had stipulated surreptitiously

!)

and clandestinely seized the minor child from the lawful
l'nstody of the Appellant and sought a move to a more
l'qnitahle haven favorable in the local forum to litigak
the issue of custody and she further, through the use of
legal technicalities avoided even the litigation of this issue
in both of these Consolidated Cases. It is submitted
"seize and run" cases,
that to place a quietus on
tl1e vVrit of Habeas Corpus of the Appellant should haye
heen granted. Otherwise, the orders of a foreign Court in
these matters become mere predatory, idle vaporings and
make a 'cat and mouse' game out of the issue of custody
with the parents playing "seize and run" with the child
as pawn.
It is further submitted that in any ('Vent, the welfare of the child and the fitness of the parents Wf're never
litigafod in the local fornm.

Respondent respectfully requests that the Writ of
Habeas Corpus be made permanent or, in the alternative, that the Default be set aside and that there be a
hearing on the merits.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND K. WIMMER
MARK S. MINER
600 Utah Savings Trust Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah

Attorneys for Appellant

